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Abstract
We examine monetary policy options for a small open economy where sovereign
default might occur due to intertemporal insolvency. Under interest rate policy and
floating exchange rates the equilibrium is indetermined. Under a fixed exchange rate
the equilibrium is uniquely determined and independent of sovereign default.
1 Introduction
In response to the financial crises, expansionary fiscal policies in many countries have led
to a surge in public debt. This has raised fears of sovereign default even for countries
that did not default in their recent history. Since public debt in industrialized countries
and even in emerging market economies are to a substantial fraction denominated in
domestic currency (see [3]), the real debt burden cannot directly be lowered by currency
devaluations. This leads to the question how exchange rate policies should be conducted
under sovereign default risk.
In this paper, we show that an exchange rate peg can shield the allocation of resources
against default risk. We apply a simple approach to sovereign default, which is based on
the "Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk" of [7], and develop a small open economy model
with a transactions friction. The government does not guarantee full debt repayment, such
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that households’ investments in government bonds depend on their default expectations.
A policy of setting the interest rate and letting the exchange rate float is then insuﬃcient
to uniquely determine the equilibrium, which corresponds to the result in [5] for a closed
economy.
If, however, the exchange rate is fixed, the equilibrium allocation is uniquely deter-
mined and shielded against default expectations. The simple reason is that by pegging
the exchange rate, the home economy can "import" risk-free foreign interest rates. This
novel argument in favor of fixed exchange rates relates to the idea of determining the price
level by pegging the exchange rate and to the "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" applied
for open economies (see [4] and [1]), which typically disregard the possibility of default.
2 The model
This section presents a small open economy version of the model in [5] with a cash-
credit good distortion and a labor income tax. Following the "Fiscal Theory of Sovereign
Default" (see [7]), we assume that tax revenues do not necessarily suﬃce to fully serve
debt obligations.
There exists a continuum of infinitely lived and identical domestic households of
mass one. Their utility increases in consumption ct and decreases in working time nt, and
their lifetime utility is
∞X
t=0
βt [log ct − ψnt] , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor. Consumption is an aggregate of domestically
produced goods cH and foreign goods cF : ct = γc1−ϑH,t c
ϑ
F,t, where 0 ≤ ϑ < 1 and γ =
[ϑϑ(1−ϑ)1−ϑ]−1. For a given level of aggregate consumption, the cost minimizing demand
for the goods of home and foreign origin are given by
cH,t = (1− ϑ) (PH,t/Pt)−1 ct, cF,t = ϑ (PF,t/Pt)−1 ct, (2)
where PH,t and PF,t are the price indices of the domestically produced and foreign con-
sumption goods, respectively. The price index of the aggregate consumption good is
then Pt = P 1−ϑH,t P
ϑ
F,t. We assume that the law of one price holds, such that PH,t =
StP ∗H,t andPF,t = StP
∗
F,t, where P
∗
H,t (P
∗
F,t ) is the price of home (foreign) goods expressed
in foreign currency and St is the nominal exchange rate.
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Households are initially endowed with domestic government bonds Bh−1 > 0 and money
M−1 > 0. They can further invest in a full set of internationally traded state contingent
claims that deliver one unit of foreign currency in each state. Since we do not model
heterogeneity or uncertainty (for simplicity), this is equivalent to consider internationally
traded risk-free bonds Ft, which are traded at 1/R∗t units of foreign currency and deliver
one unit of foreign currency. The budget constraint is
Bht R
−1
t +StFt (R
∗
t )
−1+Mt ≤ (1− δt)Bht−1+StFt−1+Mt−1+(1− τ t)Ptwtnt−Ptct+Γt, (3)
where wt denotes the real wage rate, τ t ∈ [0, 1] a labor income tax rate, and Γt firms’
profits. Domestic government bonds exhibit the period t price 1/Rt and lead to a payoﬀ
of 1− δt+1 units of domestic currency in t + 1, where the default rate δt depends on the
intertemporal government (in-)solvency (see [7]).
In each period, the asset market opens before the goods market. Money serves as a
means of payment in both markets. In the asset market, households receive cash payoﬀs
(1− δt)Bht−1 + StFt−1 and spend the amount
¡
Bht /Rt
¢
+ StFt (R∗t )
−1 on interest bear-
ing assets, such that their stock of domestic currency is reduced by Zt =
¡
Bht /Rt
¢
−
(1− δt)Bht−1 + St[Ft (R∗t )
−1 − Ft−1] when they enter the goods market. Hence, they face
the following cash constraint
Ptct ≤Mt−1 − Zt. (4)
The household maximizes (1) subject to (3), (4), a no-Ponzi game condition on interna-
tional borrowing and Bht ≥ 0, given F−1 = 0 and Bh−1 > 0, leading to the first order
conditions
ψct= (1− τ t)wt/[Rt(1− δt+1)], (5)
ct+1/ct= β (1− δt+1)Rt/πt+1, (6)
ct+1/ct= β (qt+1/qt)R∗t /π
∗
t+1, (7)
(4), and μt (Mt−1 − Zt − Ptct) ≥ 0, where μt is the multiplier on (4) satisfying μt =
(Rt(1− δt+1)− 1) ≥ 0, π∗t the foreign inflation rate π∗t = P ∗t /P ∗t−1, and qt = StP ∗t /Pt the
real exchange rate. Combining (6) and (7) leads to a "risk" adjusted uncovered interest
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rate parity UIP condition
(1− δt+1)Rt = (St+1/St)R∗t (8)
Further, (3) holds with equality and the transversality conditions are satisfied,
lim
t→∞
(bHt /Rt)Π
t
i=1πt+i/[(1− δt+i)Rt+i−1] = 0 (9)
and limt→∞ (qtft/R∗t )Πti=1π
∗
t+i/
£
(qt+i/qt+i−1)R∗t+i−1
¤
= 0.
We assume that preferences of foreign households correspond to preferences of
domestic households. Hence, foreign demand for domestically produced consumption
goods c∗H,t and the foreign consumption goods c
∗
F,t satisfy c
∗
H,t = ϑ
∗(P ∗t /P ∗H,t)c
∗
t and
c∗F,t = (1 − ϑ∗)(P ∗t /P ∗F,t)c∗t , where ϑ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and c∗t is aggregate foreign consumption.
Foreign households can also invest in internationally traded bonds and domestic govern-
ment debt Bft , where their initial endowment equals zero B
f
−1 = 0, leading to the Euler
equations
βR∗t /π
∗
t+1 =
¡
c∗t+1/c
∗
t
¢
(10)
and β (qt/qt+1) (1− δt+1)Rt/πt+1 =
¡
c∗t+1/c
∗
t
¢
(implying 8), and the associated transver-
sality conditions, which correspond to (9).
Perfectly competitive domestic firms produce the domestic consumption good with
the linear technology yH,t = nt, leading to a profit maximizing labor demand satisfying
wt = PH,t/Pt.
The government does not have access to lump-sum taxation. It borrows at home and
abroad, Bt = Bht +B
f
t , raises tax revenues by taxing labor income, purchases the amount
gt of the domestic good in each period, and receives central bank transfers τmt . Its budget
constraint is
BtR−1t + Ptst = (1− δt)Bt−1, (11)
where st denotes surpluses st = τ twtnt + τmt − (PHt /Pt)gt, which depends on the equi-
librium allocation. Rewriting (11) in real terms, (1− δ0)B−1/P0 = b0R−10 + s0 and
(1− δt+1) bt/πt+1 = bt+1R−1t+1 + st+1, and iterating forward, yields the intertemporal gov-
ernment budget constraint
(1− δ0)B−1/P0 =
∞X
t=0
st
tY
i=1
πi
(1− δi)Ri−1
+ lim
t→∞
btR−1t
tY
i=1
πi
(1− δi)Ri−1
. (12)
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We assume that the fiscal authority decides on taxes without guaranteeing repayment
of initial debt.1 In particular, we assume that the labor income tax rate is set equal to
a constant τ t = τ ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, we assume that government expenditures gt
equal zero. Thus, sovereign default δt > 0 can occur when current and future discounted
revenues from income taxation and from seigniorage are too low for given initial liabilities.
The central bank either sets the interest rate on bonds Rt or the exchange rate St, and
transfers seigniorage to the government: Mt −Mt−1 = Ptτmt , such that the consolidated
public sector budget constraint reads, BtR−1t +Mt + Ptτwtnt = (1− δt)Bt−1 +Mt−1.
3 Results
In equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, and assets (including government bonds
Bt = Bht +B
f
t ) clear. The resource constraint is
PH,tyH,t − Ptct = St [(Ft/R∗t )− Ft−1]−B
f
t R
−1
t + (1− δt)B
f
t−1. (13)
Integrating (13) from period 0 onwards and using initial values F−1 = 0 and Bh−1 = B−1 ⇒
Bf−1 = 0 as well as the foreign household transversality conditions leads to
0 =
∞X
t=0
βt
c0
ct
(PH,tyH,t − Ptct) , (14)
where we used Πti=1πi/((1− δi)Ri−1) = βtc0/ct. We assume that the domestic economy
is small in the sense that its exports are negligible for the foreign economy and that the
foreign goods price P ∗F,t equals the foreign price index, P
∗
t = P ∗F,t (see e.g. [2]). Then,
the domestic price index Pt = P 1−ϑH,t P
ϑ
F,t and the law of one price PF,t = StP
∗
t (= qtPt)
imply PH,t/Pt = q
ϑ/(ϑ−1)
t . Using the latter to rewrite foreign and domestic demand for
domestic goods (2) as c∗H,t = ϑ
∗q1/(1−ϑ)t c
∗
t and cH,t = (1 − ϑ)q
ϑ/(1−ϑ)
t ct, domestic goods
market clearing yH,t = cH,t + c∗H,t, can be rewritten as
yH,t = (1− ϑ)q
ϑ
1−ϑ
t ct + ϑ
∗q
1
1−ϑ
t c
∗
t . (15)
Like under perfect international risk sharing (see e.g. [2]), (7) and (10) can be combined
to ct+1ct =
qt+1c∗t+1
qtc∗t
∀t ≥ 0, implying that domestic and foreign consumption (in terms of
1 In fact, income tax revenues are bounded by the maximum of the Laﬀer curve.
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the domestic consumption bundle) are proportional:
ct = ξqtc∗t . (16)
To determine the constant ξ, we use that (15) together with (16) and Pt/PH,t = q
ϑ
1−ϑ
t lead
to PH,tyH,t = (1− ϑ+ ϑ∗/ξ)Ptct. Comparing the latter with (14) immediately shows that
ξ = ϑ∗/ϑ > 0, such that trade is balanced PH,tyH,t = Ptct ∀t ≥ 0. We further use the
transversality conditions for domestic and foreign holdings of public debt and wtnt = ct,
to rewrite (12) as
(1− δ0)B−1/P0 =
∞X
t=0
βt
c0
ct
(τct + τmt ) . (17)
Given balanced trade St [(Ft/R∗t )− Ft−1] = B
f
t − B
f
t−1 (see 13) and the consolidated
public sector budget constraint, the cash constraint (4) reduces to Ptct ≤Mt+Ptτwtnt ⇒
ct(1− τ) ≤ mt. Hence, under a binding cash-constraint, which requires St+1/St > 1/R∗t ,
central bank transfers satisfy τmt = (1 − τ)
¡
ct − ct−1π−1t
¢
∀t ≥ 1 such that (17) can be
rewritten as
[(1− δ0)B−1 +M−1]/P0 = c0
"
(1− β)−1 − (1− τ)
∞X
t=0
βt+1(Ptct)/(Pt+1ct+1)
#
. (18)
Since the domestic economy is small, the sequences {R∗t > 1, c∗t > 0, P ∗t > 0}∞t=0, which
have to be consistent with (10), are exogenously given. Substituting out wt(= q
ϑ/(ϑ−1)
t )
and qt in (5) and (16), we can define an equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 A perfect foresight equilibrium under a binding cash-constraint is a set of
sequences {ct ≥ 0, St > 0, Pt > 0, Rt(1− δt+1)}∞t=0 and an initial default rate δ0 satisfying
ct+1/ct= β (1− δt+1)Rt/ (Pt+1/Pt) , (19)
(1− δt+1)Rt=(St+1/St)R∗t , (20)
ψc
1
1−ϑ
t =(ec∗t ) ϑ1−ϑ 1− τRt(1− δt+1) , (21)
St=Ptct/(P ∗t ec∗t ), (22)
(18), where ec∗t = ϑ∗c∗t /ϑ, and a monetary policy setting Rt ≥ 1 or St ≥ 0, given {R∗t > 1,
c∗t > 0, P ∗t > 0}∞t=0, B−1 > 0, and M−1 > 0.
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Condition (21) shows that consumption is aﬀected by the eﬀective rate of return on bonds
(1− δt+1)Rt due to the transactions friction induced by the cash constraint (see 4 and 5).
Once consumption is determined, the real exchange rate, working time, inflation, and the
eﬀective rate of return on bonds are determined as well.
Corollary 1 Given {ct > 0}∞t=0, {qt} ∀t ≥ 0 is determined by (16), {yH,t = nt} ∀t ≥ 0
by (15), {πt = Pt/Pt−1 > 0} ∀t ≥ 1 by (19), and {(1− δt+1)Rt} ∀t ≥ 0 by (21).
A policy of setting the interest rate Rt and letting the exchange rate flow fails to determine
the equilibrium, which has been shown for a closed economy by [5]. Consider, for example,
a conventional interest rate policy where Rt is set either in an exogenous way or contingent
on macroeconomic indicators, like inflation or output, which both can be expressed in
terms of consumption (see corollary 1). The equilibrium allocation is then indetermined,
since (1− δt+1)Rt rather than the contractual rate Rt aﬀects the consumption decision
(see 21), while the repayment rate can only be determined for the initial period 1− δ0 via
(18). This result diﬀers from the FTPL case (see [6] and [8]), where default is ruled out
by assumption, even when the government does not guarantee intertemporal solvency. In
this case (δt = 0), an interest rate peg uniquely determines consumption by (21), inflation
by (19), the initial price level by (18) and the exchange rate by (22).
Here, households account for the possibility of default when they invest in domestic
bonds (see 19). Yet, the central bank can nevertheless guarantee a uniquely determined
equilibrium, which is independent of default, by pegging the exchange rate St = S.2 Then,
(1− δt+1)Rt is determined by (20), consumption by (21), the price level by (22), consistent
with (19), and the initial default rate by (18).3
Proposition 1 Under a fixed exchange rate the equilibrium is determined and the alloca-
tion of resources is independent of sovereign default. Under a (conventional) interest rate
policy and a floating exchange rate, the equilibrium is indetermined.
By pegging the exchange rate, the equilibrium allocation is shielded against sovereign
default risk. While default can still occur, this policy guarantees that the allocation and
goods prices do not depend on default expectations or the governments’ default decision
2 In this case, the cash-constraint is ensured to be binding, since (20) and R∗t > 1 imply μt > 0.
3For constant foreign variables the initial default rate is simply given by δ0 = 1 − [S(P ∗hc∗)(1 −
(1− τ) /R∗) (1− β)−1 −M−1]/B−1 and decreases with the nominal exchange rate.
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(which is not modelled here). If, for example, the government decides in each period
whether to default or not according to some decision rule (e.g. a tax-to-debt rule, see
[7]), households will base their expectations upon this "default policy". The equilibrium
allocation would then be aﬀected by default expectations, if the central bank sets Rt.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that a fixed, but not to a floating, exchange rate guarantees equilibrium
determinacy under sovereign default risk. By "importing" stable interest rates, the equilib-
rium allocation is shielded against default expectations, which provides a strong argument
in favor of exchange rate pegs, when fiscal policy does not to guarantee debt repayment.
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